AC 2

Extensions 8

Funding 11

AIDS 12

AT Violation of rights/autonomy (1:30) 13

AT Proportionality 14

AT Emotivism 15

Adapt to Community 16

Nelson 18

AC

I affirm.

**Black's Law defines the criminal-justice system** **as**,

“The collective institutions through which an accused offender passes until the accusations have been disposed of or the assessed punishment [has been] concluded. The system typically has three components: Law enforcement (police, sheriffs, marshals), the judicial process (judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers), and corrections (prison officials, probation officers, and parole officers).”

Garner, Bryan A. [Editor-in-Chief]. *Black’s Law Dictionary*, Seventh Ed. 1999. Pg. 381.

I advocate an expansion of the current drug court system to include all nonviolent drug offenders regardless of age.

**Franco 1** 2010 October 12, [Celinda Franco, Specialist in Crime Policy, “Drug Courts: Background, Effectiveness, and Policy Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41448.pdf

Drug courts are specialized court dockets, or parts of judges’ calendars of cases awaiting action in court, that generally focus on cases involving nonviolent offenders with substance-abuse problems. 1 Drug court programs generally include intensive court supervision, drug testing, and substance-abuse treatment. Under the drug court model, judges and other court personnel monitor a participant’s substance-abuse treatment and program compliance, and judges can impose immediate and graduated sanctions if offenders fail to comply with the program’s requirements. 2 Graduated sanctions can include more-frequent drug testing, in-patient detoxification and treatment, additional court appearances, and short periods of incarceration that may increase as an offender’s infractions accumulate. 3 To encourage participants’ continued compliance, drug courts also provide incentives, such as fewer drug tests, fewer court appearances, and possibly the dismissal of criminal charges or reduced or set aside sentences if the program is successfully completed. 4 By bringing intensively monitored long-term substance-abuse treatment into the criminal justice system and coercing abstinence from participants, drug courts seek to help substance-abusing offenders break the cycle of drug[s] use and criminal offending. 5 Research indicates that drug courts can reduce drug abuse, recidivism, 6 and incarceration among drug involved offenders. 7 Thus, drug courts arguably represent one viable approach to drug demand reduction among substance-abusing offenders.

First is economics.

The plan generates over 46 billion in new revenue – there is no question of economic efficacy.

**Franco 2** 2010 October 12, [Celinda Franco, Specialist in Crime Policy, “Drug Courts: Background, Effectiveness, and Policy Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41448.pdf

In an effort to analyze the available data to inform this question, researchers at the Urban Institute developed a model and a synthetic database of 40,320 client profiles that is designed to estimate the potential benefits and costs of expanding offender eligibility to participate in substance-abuse treatment through drug courts. 91 The model estimated that approximately 55,000 adult offenders are treated annually in drug courts at a cost of approximately $515 million. 92 According to this analysis of the current adult drug court treatment regime, drug court treatment resulted in approximately $2.21 in benefits for each $1 in costs, providing an estimated annual average net benefit to society of $624 million. 93d Moreover, when the Urban Institute’s model was used to estimate the effects of expanding drug court eligibility to all arrestees at risk of drug dependence or at risk of drug abuse (approximately 1.47 million), the cost of treatment exceeded $13.7 billion. The model also predicted that treatment for the entire group of arrestees could result in an estimated average net benefit of more than $46.065 billion, or a benefit to cost ratio of 3.36:1. 97 Thus, the simulation in which all existing drug court eligibility restrictions were eliminated yielded the largest cost-benefits.

Solves crime since crime is the result of desperate individuals unable to provide through legal means because of economic scarcity so revenue key to solving root cause of felonies.

Next is criminality

A. 17 empirical studies all come to the same conclusion – drug courts comparatively reduce recidivism by 32%.

**Mackinem** [former South Carolina Drug Court Coordinator] and Paul Higgins [Professor of Sociology at the University of South Carolina]. Drug Court: Constructing the Moral Identity of Drug Offenders. Charles C. Thomas, 2008. Google Books.

The body of research assessing the effectiveness of drug court [proves] supports one fundamental conclusion: drug court reduces recidivism (banks & gottfredson, 2004; Bedrick & Skolnick, 1999; Belenko, 2001; Brewster, 2001; Deschenes & Greenwood, 1994; J.S. Goldkamp, 1999; Goldkamp, White, & Robinson, 2001; Gottfredson & Exum, 2002; Gottfredson, Kearley, Najaka, & Rocha, 2005; Hora et al.,1999; Longshore et al., 2001; Nolan, 2001, 2002; Peters & Murrin, 2000; BJA, 2004; Rempel et al., 2003, Spohn, piper, Martin, & Frenzel, 2001; SMU, 2002). We discuss a rigorous study in New York State to examine in greater detail the question of drug court’s effectiveness (Rempel et al., 2003). In an oft-cited review, the government accountability office (GAO) criticized the quality of studies evaluating drug court on the basis of several methodological issues including a lack of comparison groups, short-term follow-up, and a lack of multiple-site studies (GAO,1997). The New York study, a stringent evaluation, does not suffer these shortcomings. The researchers evaluated eleven different courts located throughout the state, including courts in metropolitan, suburban and rurual setting. They followed the drug-offending subjects for three years beyond the program completion. At six of the eleven programs studied, the drug court graduates were compared to a matched sample of offenders for each court’s population, who received traditional probation services; in the remaining five, graduates were compared to nonmatched samples, such as program failures. The results from each individual court and from all six courts collectively showed that when graduates of drug courts were compared to a matched sample, drug court graduates were less likely to be rearrested. The reduction in recidivism averaged 32%. The five courts non-matched comparison groups showed similar recidivsm reductions. This finding is congruent with findings from seventeen other [evals] drug court recidivism evaluations (BJA, 2004). Drug courts reduce rearrest rates for drug-using offenders.

B. Drug courts kill recidivism – the best study on the topic confirms.

**Franco 5** 2010 October 12, [Celinda Franco, Specialist in Crime Policy, “Drug Courts: Background, Effectiveness, and Policy Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41448.pdf

GAO’s meta-analysis assessed the findings of 27 evaluations of 39 adult drug court[s] programs implemented between 1991 and 1999. 58 GAO selected these evaluations on the strength of their methodologies and compared the outcomes of drug court participants with an appropriate group of similar offenders who did not participate in such a program. 59 The report considered the outcomes of drug court participants and other comparable offenders on (1) recidivism, (2) substance-use relapse, (3) program completion of participants, and (4) the costs and benefits of the drug court programs that included this information. 60 Overall, GAO’s assessment found that drug court programs led to statistically significant recidivism reductions (i.e., reductions in rearrests or reconvictions) 61 among participants for felony offenses and drug offenses (both misdemeanor and felony). Recidivism reductions were greater and more enduring for participants than for comparison groups. Some of the evaluations also included recidivism data for participants and comparison groups for a period following the completion of a drug court program. Although the data were limited, GAO found that postprogram recidivism reductions continued to be greater for drug court participants than for comparison groups and that these reductions endured even after participants had successfully completed a drug court program. 62 In addition, among drug court participants, program graduates had lower post-program recidivism than dropouts.

Prefer the GAO study

1. It’s a meta-analysis of 27 evals. Key to solve back for variables unique to a single study like theirs and the 27 were selected for the best methodologies means I outweigh and either

A. Their study was taken into account and they still conclude aff or B. their study wasn’t strong enough to be included and you reject it. B. Directly comparative between retribution and rehab.

2. Scope of data – I incorporate 27 studies drawn nationally whereas their recidivism and deterrence studies only cite 3 or 4 states, key to solve back for the quality of individual state courts rather than the policies themselves.

Increased recidivism has several impacts. **Wilson**

Wilson, Jane [Stanford's Strauss Scholar, developing educational programs for inmates in cities across the US.] *Reducing Juvenile Recidivism in the United States*, Roosevelt Review, 2007. http://www.scribd.com/doc/19695235/Juvenile-Recidivism

The effects of recidivism in the United States fall into four general categories. First, recidivism imposes tremendous public safety costs on American communities; high recidivism rates indicate additional victimizations (assuming that the crime for which the juvenile was arrested was in fact committed). Second, increased recidivism results in extremely destructive social costs; increases in violence, crime, homelessness, family destabilization, and public health risks are all associated with high recidivism rates. Third, recidivism imposes a considerable financial burden on the U.S. Department of Justice and, more generally, on American society; our government spends an annual sixty billion dollars on correctional programs. Fourth, high recidivism indicates a failure to provide meaningful rehabilitation for inmates reentering the community; recidivist juveniles lose out on crucial educational, social, and personal developments that can rarely be regained. Additionally, studies show that recurrent offenses during teenage years can provide a dangerous inculcation leading to adult criminality. The tragedy of this cycle of criminality cannot be understated.

And I outweigh deterrence

1. If deterrence is true than that proves the efficacy of drug courts since criminals are deterred into following their rehab regimens – any defense on the aff is reason why deterrence fails.
2. Drug courts control the key internal link to deterrence because the aff solves addiction that causes irrational chemical impulses which destroys rational decision-making – deterrence presumes potential criminals are rational thinkers.

Third is adaptation.

The unique setup and review of drug courts makes them self-correcting.

**Dorf & Sabel** Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel [Michael C. Dorf is Vice-Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Charles F. Sabel is Professor of Law and Social Science, Columbia Law School.] “Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government” August 23, 1999 <http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/drug812.pdf >

What makes the drug courts distinctive and innovative, we argue, is the novel form of monitoring, and governance more generally, upon which they rely.2 The central feature of this governance system is thatthemonitored agents choose their ownprecisegoals and the means for achieving themin return for[while] furnishing a central authority with the informationthat [identifies] allows evaluation of their performance. The information in turn allows identification ofgood and bad performers, [and] improvement of the quality of the monitored information, and eventually, of the services provided. Very generally, by collaborating in this way, central authority and decentralized actors can together explore and evaluate solutions to complex problems that neither alone would have been likely to identify**,** much less investigate or address, without the exchanges with the others. The sameexchanges ofinformation**,** moreover**,** enabletheinstitutions continually to adjust their means and ends in the light of experience**.** Because this form of governance and the type of institution-building with which it is associated openly acknowledges the incomplete and ambiguous character of its initial specification of means and ends, and uses this lack of specificity as a prod to inquiry and discovery, we refer to it as experimentalist.3

Solves all disads since courts are constantly adjusting to fix problems and a comparative net benefit to retribution that can’t adjust to new circumstances. And no retribution good arguments, they’re put in the CJS if the AC fails so I coopt all deterrence.

And Drug Courts are key to prevent the spread of AIDS. Only they can stop it.

**ASC** (Arizone Supreme Court, State Level Courts, 2007, Drug Courts, http://www.supreme.state.az.us/casa/prepare/drugcourts.html)

"I believe the success of drug courts is well documented, and strong Congressional support should be given to the rehabilitation of future drug offenders. Traditional incarceration has yielded little gains for our drug offenders. Costs are too high, and the rehabilitation rate is minimal. The drug courts of America are an excellent way to make strides forward in our fight against drugs."—Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell In the year 2000, drug abuse cost American society an estimated 160 billion dollars. More significant are the immeasurable losses that are represented by this staggering figure; the destruction of lives, the damage of addiction, fatalities from car accidents, illness, and lost opportunities and dreams. Drug abuse drives some of America’s most costly social problems—including domestic violence, child abuse, chronic mental illness, the spread of AIDS, and homelessness. Drug treatment costs, hospitalization for long-term drug-related disease, and treatment of the consequences of family violence burden our already strapped health care system. Illicit drug users make over 527,000 costly emergency room visits each year for drug related problems. In 2000, there were more than 600,000 hospital emergency department drug episodes in the United States. Health care costs for drug abuse alone were about $15 billion. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention has estimated that 36 percent of new HIV cases are directly or indirectly linked to drug users who inject illegal substances into their bloodstream.

I value morality.

**The origin of government is based on individuals coming together to centralize power under a sovereign to provide protections to its citizens. Governments are thus obligated to the public good so it derives its authority from fulfilling its obligations. WEST**

Robin West. "Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society." Fordham Law Review Vol. 69 Issue 5.

Second, a recognition that rights might sometimes be positive entitlements to state action, as well as, at other times, negative entitlements to be free of state action, is truer to the philosophical liberal classics that animate the liberal tradition than the insistence of liberal constitutional rights theorists on the essential negativity of rights. Let me start with Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes regarded the positive obligation of the state to protect individuals against private violence as being at the heart of the social contract. The individual's right to that protection was the only "right" created by the transition from nature into civil society. Otherwise, the Hobbesian Leviathan can do what it wishes and the individual citizen must submit-the Hobbesian citizen does indeed lack negative rights. This is not so, however, with respect to the state's duty to protect the individual against private violence: there, the state is bound to act affirmatively, and the individual is fully entitled to a positive right. This positive right of the citizen to the state's affirmative action was by no means a peripheral feature of Hobbes' jurisprudence. Rather, the bargain struck-the individual relinquishes self help, in exchange for the state's obligation to protect him from violence-was, for Hobbes, the raison d'8tre of the state's existence. The Leviathan's protection of the individual against the private violence of others is the quid pro quo for the individual's relinquishment of his right to self-help available to him in the state of nature.' The individual, in other words, is just as contractually entitled to receive that protection as the state is obligated to provide it-in short, the citizen has a right to it. The state's obligation to protect the citizen against private violence and the citizen's continuing right to receive it, in Hobbes' view, was foundational and inalienable. If we take Hobbes seriously, the individual has a right to the state's protection against the violence or aggression of other private parties-for Hobbes, this was, to borrow a phrase from Steven Heyman's important article on this point, the "first duty of government.”

All individuals construct the state, or government, for certain protections, in return ceding rights such as the right to kill or steal. Thus the government can have obligations since they are a constitutive facet of its existence.

Thus citizens consent to government actions like laws and jail *since* it protects them. Consent controls the internal link to any ethical theory since individuals would simply choose not to follow a theory they did not consent to. These obligations are to protect each of its citizens equally. This also contextualizes what counts as a moral harm under the AC ethic – the government has an obligation to protect its citizenry from crimes and harms against them.

**Thus the standard is maximizing expected well being**.

And, governments are morally responsible for their omissions because they always face choices between different sets of policy options, all of which advantage some while disadvantaging others.

Cass R. **Sunstein and Vermeule** Adrian [“Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs. Copyright (c) 2005 The Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University. Stanford Law Review December,2005 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703]

The critics of capital punishment have been led astray by uncritically applying the act/omission distinction to a regulatory setting. Their position condemns the "active" infliction of death by governments but does not condemn the "inactive" production of death that comes from the refusal to maintain a system  [\*720]  of capital punishment. The basic problem is that even if this selective condemnation can be justified at the level of individual behavior, it is difficult to defend for governments. [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.737298.6087973779&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1187847773274&returnToKey=20_T1938900223&parent=docview##) A great deal of work has to be done to explain why "inactive," but causal, government decisions should not be part of the moral calculus. Suppose that we endorse the deontological position that it is wrong to take human lives, even if overall welfare is promoted by taking them. Why does the system of capital punishment violate that position, if the failure to impose capital punishment also takes lives? We suggest that the distinction between government acts and omissions, even if conceptually coherent, is not morally relevant to the question of capital punishment. Some governmental actions are morally obligatory, and some governmental omissions are blameworthy. In this setting, we suggest, government is morally obligated to adopt capital punishment and morally at fault if it declines to do so. The most fundamental point is that, unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.737298.6087973779&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1187847773274&returnToKey=20_T1938900223&parent=docview##) Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action - for example, private killing - becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it. To be sure, a system of punishments that only weakly deters homicide, relative to other feasible punishments, does not quite authorize homicide, but that system is not properly characterized as an omission, and little turns on whether it can be so characterized. Suppose, for example, that government fails to characterize certain actions - say, sexual harassment - as tortious or violative of civil rights law and that it therefore permits employers to harass employees as they choose or to discharge employees for failing to submit to sexual harassment. It would be unhelpful to characterize the result as a product of governmental "inaction." If employers are permitted to discharge employees for refusing to submit to sexual harassment, it is because the law is allocating certain entitlements to employers rather than employees. Or consider the context of ordinary torts. When Homeowner B sues Factory A over air pollution, a decision not to rule for Homeowner B is not a form of inaction: it is the allocation to Factory A of a property right to pollute. In such cases, an apparent government omission is an action simply because it is an allocation of legal rights. Any decision that allocates such rights, by creating entitlements  [\*722]  and prohibitions, is not inaction at all.

Also, the resolution is a question of comparing worlds; the resolution is a statement that divides ground between the aff and neg worlds, not the object of evaluation. The topic functions as an umbrella under which the aff forms an advocacy, and the neg can form a counter advocacy. Truth-testing prescribes an absolute, unmeetable burden to the aff and gives the neg infinite ground. Comparing worlds gives the aff flexibility in crafting an advocacy while maintaining neg flexibility through counterplan, disad, and phil ground. Comparing worlds by definition evaluates the desirability of two states of affairs, so the neg must defend a counter advocacy or state of affairs and this implies consequentialism.

And, we all believe that we ought morally make the world better when we can—the burden of proof is on them to show otherwise. Thus, winning reasons to reject their standard is sufficient reason to default to the AC even if I do not win proactive reason to prefer mine.

Sinott-Armstrong (Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/consequentialism/>.)

Even if consequentialists can accommodate or explain away common moral intuitions, that might seem only to answer objections without yet giving any positive reason to accept consequentialism. However, most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better when we can. The question then is only whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989, 1998) If no objection reveals any need for anything beyond consequences, then consequences alone seem to determine what is [moral]morally right or wrong, just as consequentialists claim.

Prefer systematic empirical analysis as opposed to their outrageous impact scenarios,

CNN writes (http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/17/pf/experts\_Tetlock.moneymag/index.htm)

Yet we can't tear ourselves away. The crisis has brought record ratings to CNBC and its parade of talking heads. You're probably still entrusting your portfolio to the experts running mutual funds. Despite everything, we can't shake the belief that elite forecasters know better than the rest of us what the future holds. The record, unfortunately, proves no such thing. And no one knows that record better than Philip Tetlock, 54, a professor [at UC Berkeley]of organizational behavior at the Haas Business School at the University of California-Berkeley. Tetlock is the world's top expert on, well, top experts. Some 25 years ago, he began an experiment to quantify the forecasting skill of political experts. By the time he finished in 2003, Tetlock had signed up nearly 300 academics, economists, policymakers and journalists and mapped more than 82,000 forecasts against real-world outcomes, analyzing not just what the experts said but how they thought: how quickly they embraced contrary evidence, for example, or reacted when they were wrong. And wrong they usually were, barely beating out a random forecast generator. But you shouldn't simply write all gurus off. Tetlock's research found that one kind of expert turns out consistently more accurate forecasts than others. Understanding what makes them better can help you make more reliable predictions in your own life. Tetlock explained it all to Money's former managing editor, Eric Schurenberg, in a recent interview. Why did so many experts miss the economic crash? The people intimately involved in packaging [financial derivatives like] CDOs must have had some sense that they were unstable. But their superiors seem to have been lulled into complacency, partly because they were making a lot of money very fast and had no motivation to look closer. So greed played a role. But hubris may have played a bigger one. Remember Greek tragedy? The gods don't like mortals who get too uppity. In this case the biggest source of hubris was the mathematical models that claimed you could turn iffy loans into investment-grade securities. The models rested on a misplaced faith in the law of large numbers and on wildly miscalculated estimates of the likelihood of a national collapse in real estate. But mathematics has a certain mystique. People get intimidated by it, and no one challenged the models. Americans were shocked at how wrong the experts were. You weren't. Why not? My research certainly prepared me for widespread forecasting failures. We found that our experts' predictions barely beat random guesses - the statistical equivalent of a dart-throwing chimp - and proved no better than predictions of reasonably well-read nonexperts. Ironically, the more famous the expert, the less accurate his or her predictions tended to be.

**And the aff gets RVI’s.**

A) The six minute 2NR – neg can always go for theory and substance screws the 2AR which has to cover both in three minutes.

This also means all interps violations must be clarified in cross ex since I might concede their interp so grant the automatic I meet if they don’t ask.

B) Competing mutually exclusive interps – the neg can always run theory such as must spec actor or can’t spec actor, but I can’t do the same.

And these are offensive reasons why the negative never gets the RVI, the aff is already structurally skewed.

**Finally**, if neg wins a violation on T, re-evaluate offense under the new interp. 1. I speak in the dark, whereas neg can adapt to the AC, so give aff the reciprocal right to adapt. 2. Multiple legit interps means aff is subject to T every round. I can't predict community norms for T this early in the topic. 3. It would be unfair to nullify 6 minutes of the AC for a marginally better interp on T. Their T shell justifies dropping the arguments about implementation, not me as a debater.

The advocacy is clearly T

1. It tries rehab first and retrib only if that fails, thus valuing it higher A. gives priority B. possibility retrib doesn’t happen
2. 52% of incarcerated individuals are because of drugs or are drug related[[1]](#footnote-1) – this is the core of the topic.
3. Any system that valued rehab would implement the specific policies outlined in the AC because they serve as the justification for that valuation.

Ought” can only refer to action, even when used in the context of “ought to be.” **PRICHARD:**

Prichard, Harold. 1912. “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 21:21-37. Gendered language modified. http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that the apprehension that something good which is not an action ought to be involves just the feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the thought of the action which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) The word "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone. The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." Even if we are sometimes moved to say that the world or something in it is not what it ought to be, what we really mean is that God or some human being has not made something what he [or she] ought to have made it. And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that we can only feel the imperativeness upon us of something which is in our power; for it is actions and actions alone which, directly at least, are in our power.

**To conclude, Bacik clarifies rehab and retribution**.

[Ivana Bacik, Reid Professor of Criminal Law, Criminology and Penology at Trinity College, Dublin Law School, January 2001. “Crime and Punishment - Retribution or Rehabilitation” The Bar Council of Ireland http://www.lawlibrary.ie/viewdoc.asp?Docid=144&Catid=18&StartDate=01+January+2001]

Apart from three strikes, most retributive punishment [is an action] systems are however based on the notion of proportionality. That is the accepted convention since the age of Beccaria. He and other eighteenth century reformers advocated that punishment should always be 'the minimum possible in the given circumstances, proportionate to the crime, and determined by the law.' His classical theory of proportionate, retributive sentencing challenged the 'arbitrary and barbarous' system of punishment practised by European despots through the Middle Ages. It has formed the basis for all European sentencing systems until today, and was certainly an improvement on what went before, under the 'bloody codes'. But retributive theory, even when proportionate, is a backward-looking way of justifying punishment. Its success or failure cannot be measured, because it is self-justifying. I propose to argue that it is not an effective sentencing model to adopt, since its behavioural premise is flawed. By contrast, the rehabilitation model of sentencing is expressed through strategies designed to reform the offender's character. It is based on a different, and in my view a more realistic, behavioural premise. It assumes that criminal offences are to a significant effect determined by social structures, particular individual circumstances or psychological influences. Offenders are seen as needing help to change[s] their behavior, by changing their circumstances through a range of different programmes such as individual counselling, therapy, family intervention, education and training. This approach to sentencing is particularly forward-looking, since it indicates that sentences should be tailored to the needs of individual offenders.

Republicans support rehab in the CJS, specifically drug courts.

**Fausset**,[Richard Fausset, Bureau Chief of the LA Times, Conservatives latch onto prison reform, LA Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/28/nation/la-na-conservative-crime-20110129, January 28th, 2011]

Reporting from Atlanta — Reduced sentences for drug crimes. More job training and rehabilitation programs for nonviolent offenders. Expanded alternatives to doing hard time. In the not-too-distant past, conservatives might have derided those concepts as mushy-headed liberalism — the essence of "soft on crime. "Nowadays, these same ideas are central to a strategy being packaged as "conservative criminal justice reform," and have rolled out in right-leaning states around the country in an effort to rein in budget-busting corrections costs. Encouraged by the recent success of reform efforts in Republican-dominated Texas — where prison population growth has slowed and crime is down —conservative leaders elsewhere have embraced their own versions of the strategy. South Carolina adopted a similar reform package last year. Republican governors are backing proposals in Louisiana and Indiana. The about-face might feel dramatic to those who remember the get-tough policies that many conservatives embraced in the 1980s and '90s: In Texas, Republican Clayton Williams ran his unsuccessful 1990 gubernatorial campaign with a focus on doubling prison space and having first-time drug offenders "bustin' rocks" in military-style prison camps. Now, with most states suffering from nightmare budget crises, many conservatives have acknowledged that hard-line strategies, while partially contributing to a drop in crime, have also added to fiscal havoc. Corrections is now the second-fastest growing spending category for states, behind Medicaid, costing $50 billion annually and accounting for 1 of every 14 discretionary dollars, according to the Pew Center on the States. That crisis affects both parties, and state Democratic leaders have also been looking for ways to reduce prison populations. But it is conservatives who have been working most conspicuously to square their new strategies with their philosophical beliefs — and sell them to followers long accustomed to a lock-'em-up message. Much of that work is being done by a new advocacy group called Right on Crime, which has been endorsed by conservative luminaries such as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, former Education Secretary William J. Bennett, and Grover Norquist of Americans for Tax Reform. The group has identified 21 states engaged in some aspect of what they consider to be conservative reform, including California. On its website, the group concedes that the "incarceration-focused" strategies of old filled jails with nonviolent offenders had bloated prison budgets, while failing to prevent many convicts from returning to crime when they got out.

Prefer my ev 1. Speculates on future action based on how they actually voted in the past 2. Directly comparative between past vs present mindest 3. Cites national trends over the last 3 years towards laxer sentences 4. Speaks to the motivation of legislators and how they make decisions.

And, rehab respects criminals. **ADAMS 3**

Joseph Q. Adams, Georgia State University. "Retribution Requires Rehabilitation." Philosophy Theses, Department of Philosophy. 2008.

Rehabilitation, as I conceive of it, is permitted by Morris because it maintains respect for criminals as demanded by the Kantian framework. Rehabilitation thought of as moral education is permitted by the Kantian framework because we are allowed to try to convince those who break the law [them] that their behavior is contrary to society's rules and likely immoral. Nothing in Morris's theory seems to deny the permissibility of a state institution of rehabilitation, as long as that [the] institution does not take to treating criminals as patients, rather than agents. As we saw, Morris is committed to respecting [respects] the role of reason and must allow[s] criminals and others to express their beliefs about criminal behavior and law. This commitment seems to extend[s] to us the moral permissibility of setting up an institution of rehabilitation.

Rehab doesn't justify indefinite sentencing. Criminal justice still has checks to ensure fairness and proportionality. Retributive systems are the cause of such harms. **RUBIN 03**

Edward Rubin, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, "Just Say No to Retribution," Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 36, 2003.

Once again, the problem with this criticism is that it fails to state a theory for analysis, or to establish an explicit metric. The implied metric seems to be that a social program should be condemned if an y sort o f government, no matter how different from our own , could use it as a rationale for practices that we find unacceptable. No program could withstand such a test, however. Communist China used public education to indoctrinate its children,140 the Soviet Union used mental health to suppress dissent,141 a n d Nazi G erman y used r ecreation al programs to foment aggressive attitudes.142 These lugubrious examples may be useful as a warning against potential abuses, but they cannot, by themselves, be taken as a criticism of an otherwise acceptable program. I n one of his more considered moments, Allen states that "the rehabilitative ideal has revealed itself in practice to be peculiarly vulnerable to debasement and the serving of unintended and unexpressed social ends."143 While this is more plausible than his comparison with Communist China, he has just as little basis for asserting it. What does it mean to say that a program is "particularly vulnerable to debasement?" Without stating some standard for vulnerability of this sort, the statement stands for nothing more than Allen's a priori decision to hold rehabilitation accountable for every abuse committed by someone who asserted a commitment to that principle. He has no evidence that the principle caused the abuse, or made it in any way more likely to occur. The concern that a rehabilitative theory of punishment would authorize extreme techniques of thought reform and bio-chemical manipulation, for unlimited periods of time, is essentially a political fantasy, at least within the context of our current political system. This idea is widely asserted by punishment theorists at present,144 but its earliest articulation, so far as I can tell, is in a science fiction novel by C.S. Lewis.145 I n fact, the criticism of rehabilitation as an inducement to abusive practices is almost certainly false when considered in the context of American corrections. It has always been the doctrine espoused by the most progressive elements in the correctional establishment. The rigors of the Auburn and Pennsylvania system may seem excessive, but they were humane when compared to torture, or to the death penalty. The rehabilitative approaches that followed were generally more humane, and expressed a sincere concern for the felon as an individual. Pavlovian thought reform, although theoretically consistent with the concept of rehabilitation, was never instituted to any significant extent in American prisons, even when Pavlov's ideas were very much in vogue.146 If one wanted to catalogue the worst abuses in American corrections, one would certainly choose the convict leasing system, the plantation model prisons, and the current Scylla and Charybdis of under-funding and over-crowding, not those prisons that were organized along rehabilitative lines. The claim that rehabilitation would authorize indeterminately long sentences is equally a product of abstract academic alarmism. Indeterminate sentencing, although sometimes justified on rehabilitative grounds, was widely used, and misused, in situations where no effort to rehabilitate the prisoner was being made. Nor were the lengthy sentences that sometimes resulted based on any definitive test for rehabilitation that the prisoner had failed to satisfy. Rather, the combination of indeterminate sentencing and discretionary parole was primarily employed to give prisoners an incentive to behave themselves when they were in the institution, and to enable prisons to delay the release of individuals who were deemed a continued danger to society. The theoretical possibility that someone who committed a relatively minor offense would be retained for several decades because he was resistant to a rehabilitative program is more fanciful than real. It is during the retributivist era that such abuses have occurred, generally as a result of recidivist statutes. I n an y case, it must be c on ceded that rehabilitation, like any other theory of punishment, including retribution, cannot be justly translated into prescribed prison terms without relying on the independent principle of proportionality.

**AND**, crime kills international credibility. **FALK 12**

Richard Falk, "When soft power is hard," July 2012.

This unabashed avowal of imperial goals is the main thesis of the article, perhaps most graphically expressed in the following words: "The United States can increase the effectiveness of its military forces and make the world safe for soft power, America's inherent comparative advantage." As the glove fits the hand, soft power complements hard power within the wider enterprise of [in] transforming the world in the United States' image, or at least in the ideal version of the United States' sense of self. The authors acknowledge (rather parenthetically) that their strategy may not work if the US continues much longer to be seen unfavourably abroad as a national abode of drugs, crime, [and] violence, fiscal irresponsibility, family breakdown, and political gridlock. They make a rather meaningless plea to restore "a healthy democracy" at home as a prelude to the heavy lifting of democratising the world, but they do not pretend medical knowledge, and offer no prescriptions for restoring the health of the American body politic. And now, 16 years after their article appeared, it would appear that the adage, "disease unknown, cure unknown", applies.

<http://173.231.132.82/sites/default/files/documents/Assessing_Efectiveness.pdf>

**Methodology for new study O. Mitchell et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 40 (2012) 60–71**

The population of evaluations eligible for this review was experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of drug courts that utilized a comparison group. The criteria for inclusion were that: (a) the evaluation examined a drug court program4 ; (b) the evaluation included a comparison group that was treated in a traditional fashion by the court system (e.g., probation with or without referral to treatment) 5 ; (c) the evaluations reported a measure of criminal behavior, such as arrest or conviction for some measurement period following the start of the program (the measure may have been based on ofﬁ- cial records or self-report); and (d) enough information was reported to compute an effect size. The goal of the search strategy was to identify all evaluations, published or unpublished, meeting the above eligibility criteria. In order to achieve this objective, a multi-pronged search strategy was utilized. The search began by conducting a computerized keyword search of bibliographic databases. In particular, we conducted a search of the following databases: NCJRS, Criminal Justice Abstracts, Dissertation Abstracts, PsycINFO, Sociological Abstracts, Social Science Citation Index, Sciences Citation Index Expanded, Arts & Humanities Citation Index, Conference Papers Index, Ingentaconnect, C2 SPECTR, and CINAHL, as well as Google internet searches. The keywords used were: drug court (drug court\*), DWI court (DWI court\*), DUI court (DUI court\*), evaluation, recidivism, re-arrest, and re-conviction. Each of the ﬁrst three keywords was used in combination with each of the four latter terms. Our search found 370 potentially eligible studies. We retrieved 365 of the potentially eligible studies for further review. (The remaining ﬁve studies cannot be located.) Of the retrieved studies, 181 were eligible for this systematic review. Many of the eligible studies, however, utilized overlapping samples or the same sample in initial and follow-up evaluations of one drug court. These 181 studies yielded 62 O. Mitchell et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 40 (2012) 60–71154 independent evaluations of drug court programs. These 154 eligible and independent evaluations form the sample for this systematic. Table 1 provides descriptive information on the evaluations and drug courts examined in this review. Most of the drug court evaluations examined the effectiveness of adult drug courts. Ninety-two of the 154 evaluations (60%) assessed adult drug courts. Another 34 (22%) evaluations examined juvenile drug courts and the remaining 28 (18%) evaluations probed DWI (driving while intoxicated) courts. All but eight of the eligible evaluations examined U.S. drug courts. Four of the remaining evaluations examined adult drug courts in Australia. Two evaluations were of Canadian drug courts. One evaluation assessed a juvenile drug court in New Zealand, and another examined an adult drug court in Guam.

**Recividsm results**

type (adult, juvenile, and DWI) by outcome type. The forest plots for the general recidivism effects are shown in Figs. 1 through 3. The forest-plots show a clear pattern of evidence favoring drug courts with most evaluations observing effects favoring the drug court (88%, 70%, and 85%, for adult, juvenile, and DWI, respectively). The general recidivism measure is both statistically signiﬁcant for all three court types and moderate to small in size (mean odds-ratio of 1.66, 1.37, and 1.65, for adult, juvenile, and DWI, respectively). Relative to a 50% recidivism rate in the control group (a typical value), these translate into recidivism rates for the drug court of 37.6%, 42.2%, and 37.7%

Funding

Funding is a composite of federal and state level taxes.

**Franco 2** 2010 October 12, [Celinda Franco, Specialist in Crime Policy, “Drug Courts: Background, Effectiveness, and Policy Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41448.pdf

Although drug courts are mostly initiated and funded at the state and local level, Congress has supported the development, implementation, and expansion of drug courts through the federal Drug Court Discretionary Grant[s] Program, originally authorized under Title V of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). While the federal drug court grant program authorization of appropriations expired in FY2008, the program has continued to receive appropriations: $40 million for FY2009 (P.L. 111-8) and $45 million for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117). In the 111 th Congress, H.R. 6090 would amend the program and extend the authorization of appropriations for drug court grants from FY2011 through FY2017. Congress could consider reauthorizing the program in its current form or amending the program to reflect issues of concern.

AIDS

And, new off

1. AIDS spread and mutations will cause extinction

Lederberg (Joshua Lederberg**,** Molecular biologist and Nobel Prize winner in 1958, 1991 In Time of Plague: The History and Social Consequences of Lethal Epidemic Disease, p 35-6)

Will Aids mutate further ? Already known, a vexing feature of AIDS is its antigenic variability, further complicating the task of developing a vaccine. So we know that HIV is still evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far more HIV on earth today than ever before in history. What are the odds of its learning the tricks of airborne transmission? The short is, “No one can be sure.” But we could make the same attribution about any virus; alternatively the next influenza or chicken pox may mutate to an unprecedented lethality. As time passes, and HIV seems settled in a certain groove, that is momentary reassurance in itself. However, given its other ugly attributes,  it is hard to imagine a worse threat to humanity than an airborne variant of AIDS. No rule of nature contradicts such a possibility; the proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an analogue to the emergence of pneumonic plague.

Every new case of AIDS exponentially increases the risk of AIDS mutation and destruction.

2. Moral uncertainty means we default to preventing extinction. Bostrom

(2011) Nick Bostrom, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest[s] an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not [or] even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving**—**and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

AT Violation of rights/autonomy (1:30)

1. Turn: Drug courts require consent of the accused so aff gives more rights since they have a choice of punishment whereas in the neg world they have zero input.
2. Turn: Drug courts allow for commuting of sentences and getting rid of other punishments so A. aff gives control to victim B. possibility of lesser punishment than neg world.
3. Turn: even if rehab is bad the mindset shift respects autonomy better A. the intent to help not punish B. future policies will reflect this
4. Turn: Drug courts control the internal link to forming contracts since contracts presume rational consent only way to be rational is stop decisions influenced by drugs
5. Turn: government has contract with prisoners and other citizens to protect them means aff impacts turn the neg
6. Turn: The aff world gives prisoners a voice in drug courts so the AC controls the internal link to the NC since only the aff allows us to subjectively define what counts as a violation of personhood. This also means the AC comes before evaluating the neg impacts.
7. Turn: rehab best accounts for culpability and the criminal's violation of self-restraint. **ADAMS 2**

Joseph Q. Adams, Georgia State University. "Retribution Requires Rehabilitation." Philosophy Theses, Department of Philosophy. 2008.

The other thing to keep in mind, though, is that we are still limiting the criminal's liberty through rehabilitation. In this way, we are still accounting for the unfair benefit the criminal received by throwing off his burden of self-restraint. 41 The difference is that we are just choosing to do things differently during the time in which the criminal's liberty is restricted. Instead of punishing him and throwing off our duty to uphold law abiding citizens' confidence, we instead engage in rehabilitation.

Outweighs neg offense A. still maintains obligation to non-criminals to keep their confidence B. nonunique’s the NC, only aff has a risk of offense.

1. Turn: the Bacik definition clarifies retribution as proportionate based on the law not based on a moral metric, 2 implications 1. The NC does not provide appropriate punishment from a moral perspective 2. Only the aff has a risk of offense because rehab does have moral content.
2. Turn: The citizens’ intent behind formation of the state is for protection, so the AC is more consistent with the autonomy of individuals because by reducing recidivism it respects their initial intent in construction of the CJS.

10. TURN: Retribution subordinates the autonomy and rights of the criminal to the community. Only through a rehabilitative system can rationality be affirmed for both the criminal and the community.

**DUFF** Antony Duff. "Punishment, Communication, and Community."

Thus Goldman argues thatif someone breaks the law, thus flouting his duties as a citizen, his "package of citizenship rights reverts temporarily to trusteeship by the community" (1982, 67-68).In exercising that trusteeship, the community must seek to restore him as soon as possible to full enjoyment of his rights by restoring him to membership of the law-abiding community, and must preserve as many of those rights as possible, while preventing his commission of further crimes. Incapacitation and rehabilitation [is] are therefore the proper goals of punishment; and by emphasizing offenders restoration to community, we avoid the charge that they are simply being sacrificed to the community's good.

AT Proportionality

1. Turn: the best evaluator for whether punishment is proportional or not is the judge since they have access to all relevant facts, but drug courts are only prescribed when the judge thinks it’s appropriate turns the neg and outweighs their offense.
2. Turn: The advocacy still gives punishment because the difference between rehab and retribution is intent, intent of drug court policies are forced reformation of the criminal that prioritizes society over them.
3. Turn: Punishment is subjective i.e. some people think euthanasia is murder some think it’s good punishment is determined by effects on external bodies like society so aff turns the neg
4. No bright line how much punishment is necessary to meet proportionality means any punishment is sufficient so aff meets.
5. Turn: aff gives best of both worlds because forces to reform that is punishment by forcing change in lifestyle, or they’re thrown in jail for additional punishment.
6. Turn: punishment is definitionally the constraint of ones will by another so aff meets because criminals subjugated by the CJS.
7. Turn: aff precedes neg because must be alive to evaluate whether punishment is proportional, recidivism kills people so aff comes first.
8. Turn: intent behind rehab is to fix individuals – key to acknowledging they are flawed in the first place which respects their violation.

AT Emotivism

1. Turn: individuals emotionally want rehab empirically confirmed A. policies already exist to a small extent B. the squo is currently shifting to move them
2. Turn: she concedes out of the ac framework individuals intuitively conceive of government for protection so their emotion is for protection, so aff impacts turn the NC
3. Turn: citizens join the social contract and emotively want promises to be kept, which is why we engage in them in the first place
4. Turn: Dorf and Sabel says drug courts constantly shifting to reflect current issues two implications A. the NC is NOT COMPETITIVE with the aff since drug courts can just shift to cohere with our emotions B. rehab always coheres better because rehab policies are flexible and constantly shifting
5. Turn: We emotively want to be helped which is why we do things like help people cross the road or give tips, rehab definitionally helps the abuser
6. Turn: giving back the right to vote controls the internal link to NC impacts because it provides the voice that allows individuals to express their emotive desires
7. Turn: the first intuition is to express our voices and not be silenced since silencing is the ultimate submission of the will
8. Turn: individuals are self-interested and thus emotively endorse policies that maintain their own wellbeing, so the AC contention level turns the NC.
9. The NC contention level offense must be specific to drug courts or else there’s no neg offense since I only defend the implementation of drug courts.
10. Turn: Drug courts give offenders the decision whether to do them or not, coheres with our fundamental emotive drives to be independent and have control over ourselves, outweighs neg offense since the reason we care about individuals emotions is we presume they have moral worth as autonomous beings.

Adapt to Community

A. Courts are variable by jurisdiction to suit the specific problems of the community.

**Franco 6** 2010 October 12, [Celinda Franco, Specialist in Crime Policy, “Drug Courts: Background, Effectiveness, and Policy Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41448.pdf

State drug courts vary from one jurisdiction to another in terms of structure, scope, and target populations, but they all have three primary goals: (1) reduce recidivism among participants, (2) reduce substance abuse among participants, and (3) rehabilitate participants to improve their chances of successful reintegration into society by providing social services such as employment, job training, education, and housing assistance. 43 Drug courts are designed and developed at the local level and vary depending on the needs and resources of the community where they are implemented. Drug courts are often programs designed to divert less-serious offenders charged with simple possession of drugs, or with being under the influence of drugs, from the regular criminal justice system into some form of substance-abuse treatment. Consequently, drug courts are often referred to as a programmatic application of “therapeutic jurisprudence,” in recognition that illegal drug use and abuse are criminal justice/law enforcement problems and public health problems with roots in the community. 44

Controls the internal link to all solvency since one size fits all policies don’t take into account environmental and community factors that influence crime and destructive behavior such as socio-economic status which is the motivation for crime.

The drug courts used to convict those that have commited the violent crimes are successful at reducing crime and drug use.

West Huddleston, III Douglas B. Marlowe, J.D., Ph.D. Rachel Casebolt

Painting the Current Picture: A National Report Card on Drug Courts and Other Problem-Solving Court Programs in the United States,

May 2008, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/12902_PCP_fnl.pdf>

In February of 2005, the GAO issued its third report on the effects of adult criminal drug courts. Results from 23 program evalu- ations confirmed that drug courts significantly reduced crime. Moreover, although up-front costs for drug courts were generally higher than for probation, drug courts were found to be more cost-effective in the long run because they avoided law enforcement efforts, judicial case-processing, and victim- ization resulting from future criminal activity. In the ensuing years, researchers have con- tinued to uncover definitive evidence for both the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of drug courts. The most rigorous and conser- vative estimate of the effect of any program is derived from “meta-analysis,” in which scientists statistically average the effects of the program over numerous research studies. Four independent meta-analyses have now concluded that drug courts significantly reduce crime rates an average of approximately 7 to 14 percentage points (Aos, Miller, & Drake, 2006; Lowenkamp, Holsinger, & Latessa, 2005; Shaffer, 2006; Wilson, Mitchell, & MacKenzie, 2006). In some evaluations the effects on crime were as high as 35 percent- age points. Statewide evaluations have produced similar- ly impressive findings. A recent study of nine adult drug courts in California reported that re-arrest rates over a 4-year period were 29% for drug court clients (and only 17% for drug court graduates) as compared to 41% for similar drug offend- erswho did not participate in drug court (Carey, Finigan, Crumpton, & Waller, 2006). Another study of four adult drug courts in Suffolk County, MA, found that drug court participants were 13% less likely to be re-arrested, 34% less likely to be re-convicted, and 24% less likely to be re-incarcerated than probationers who had been carefully matched to the drug court participants using sophisticated “propensity score” analyses (Rhodes, Kling, & Shively, 2006). A recent long-term evaluation of the Multnomah County (Portland, OR) Drug Court found that crime was reduced by 30% over 5 years, and effects on crime were still detectable an astounding 14 years from the time of arrest (Finigan, Carey, & Cox, 2007). Courts represent the largest increase of variation in adult drug courts from 2004 to 2007, up 233%. Four independent meta-analyses have now concluded that drug courts significantly reduce crime rates. Crime was reduced by 30% over 5 years and effects on crime were still detectable an astounding 14 years from the time of arrest.

Nelson

**Nelson:** Nelson, Adam F. 2008. Towards A Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate.

And the truth-statement model of the resolution imposes an absolute burden of proof on the affirmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the affirmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truth-claims until we are persuaded otherwise, the affirmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the affirmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufficient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges find ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the negativeneed only prevent the affirmativefrom provingthetruthof the resolution**,** it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seemfundamentally unfair, as they provide the negativewithfunctionallyinfinite ground, as there are a nearly infinite variety of suchskeptical objections to normative claims**,** while continuing to bind the affirmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

1. 2010 October 12, [Celinda Franco, Specialist in Crime Policy, “Drug Courts: Background, Effectiveness, and Policy Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41448.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-1)